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1-95 A/KIA THE DRUG TRAFFICKER'S
FREEWAY, AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
THE HONORABLE ROBERT

H.

HOBGOOD*

INTRODUCTION

This article tests the proposition that since July 5, 1984, the
date the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling in
United States. v. Leon,' a criminal defendant in a search and
seizure case can expect disparate results in different state trial
courts although identical factual situations exist. First, this article hypothetically pits two drug mules against a reasonably welltrained officer with a defective search warrant. It then assumes
that a search warrant has been issued erroneously by a magistrate and further that the defendant moves to suppress evidence
in six state trial courts: Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Virginia and New Jersey.
The defect in the search warrant is that the affidavit attached
to the search warrant fails to establish probable cause to believe
that controlled substances will be found in a particular place due
to staleness of the information and insufficient sworn statements
concerning the reliability of the confidential informant. One constant in this hypothetical is that a reasonably well-trained officer
would not know that the warrant is defective and could reasonably act in objective good faith in searching for and seizing the
controlled substances described in the search warrant.
The defective search warrant is challenged in state trial court
by a defense motion to suppress the admission into evidence of the
seized controlled substances. The state trial judge conducts a pretrial hearing at which evidence, including the search warrant with
affidavit attached, is presented. In a written order, the state trial
judge makes findings of facts. On the basis of the findings of facts,
the state trial judge then makes conclusions of law. Analysis of
the law requires the judge to review the Fourth Amendment to the
* Judge Hobgood is currently the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge of

the Ninth Judicial District of North Carolina. He received both his A.B. and J.D.
degrees from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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United States Constitution; search and seizure provisions in that
state's constitution; state statutes concerning: criminal procedure,
search and seizure and the exclusionary rule; and state and federal case law.
The state trial judge then allows or denies the defendant's
motion to suppress. If the motion is allowed, then the seized controlled substances are inadmissible at trial. Conversely, if the
motion is denied, the seized controlled substances are admissible
at trial. Either ruling is appealable to a state appellate court.
However, a denial ruling is appealable only after a conviction at
trial, or after a plea of guilty by the defendant reserving the right
to appeal the suppression issue.
This hypothetical assumes that the state trial judge indeed
allows the motion to suppress the evidence, and that the state district attorney, or commonwealth attorney, appeals the ruling to
the appropriate appellate court. The state district attorney urges
that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as set forth in the United States
Supreme Court case of United States v. Leon.
Section I presents and traces the history of discussion on this
issue. Significant federal cases and relevant state cases are cited,
and law review articles provide scholarly comment. Section II
traces the hypothetical journey of the two "mules" transporting
controlled substances on Interstate 95 from Miami International
Airport to Newark, New Jersey and their arrest in six states: Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and New
Jersey. Analysis will begin in Section III with Florida and progress northward to Georgia in Section IV, South Carolina in Section V, North Carolina in Section VI, Virginia in Section VII, and
New Jersey in Section VIII.
This article argues that a criminal in a search and seizure
case can expect disparate results in different state trial courts
although identical factual situations exist. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Leon has not been applied with
uniformity in state courts. Furthermore, this article finds that
some state courts, relying on "adequate and independent" state
grounds, have afforded criminal defendants greater protection
under state constitutions and statutes than they would receive in
other state courts or federal district courts. Finally, this article
argues that state appellate courts must write their opinions with
clarity.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/3
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.2
Unquestionably, probable cause is the constitutionally
imposed standard for determining whether a search and seizure is
lawful. Most state constitutions contain search and seizure provisions with a probable cause standard.
Weeks v. United States,3 created the exclusionary rule in federal court.4 The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence
secured through an illegal search and seizure. 5 "Convictions by
means of unlawful seizures.., should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts.. ."6 Mapp v. Ohio7 applied the exclusionary

rule to all state courts pursuant to the due process clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby creating a national standard for
police conduct and a meaningful national system of individual
rights in the field of search and seizure.'
Until 1983, courts could rely on the Aguilar-Spinelli test in
determining probable cause. In Aguilar v. Texas, 9 the United
States Supreme Court created standards that required magistrates to examine and verify the basis of an informant's information and the credibility of an informant.' ° Aguilar established a
two-pronged test: knowledge and veracity. 1 The basis of the
knowledge prong requires the police to reveal the informant's
source of information.' 2 The veracity prong requires the police to
show the magistrate proof of the informant's credibility.'" In
2. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 392, 398.
Id. at 392.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Id. at 655-57.
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Spinelli v. U.S., 1 4 the Supreme Court held that the knowledge
prong could be satisfied if the information provided was sufficiently detailed.' 5 Furthermore, the veracity prong could be satisfied if the information provided was enhanced by corroborative
16
information produced by the police.
In 1983, the Supreme Court replaced the two pronged test of
17
Aguilar-Spinelli with a "totality of the circumstances" test.
Under this test, the magistrate considers all of the circumstances,
including the credibility of the informant and the basis of his
knowledge, in determining probable cause.'
The exclusionary rule does not appear in the United States
Constitution, but rather is a judicially created remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations. 19 It may be classified as a constitutionally
required judicial rule. The exclusionary rule has been controversial over the years. Its sharpest critic was Judge Cardozo, who
stated that "the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."2 ° Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United
States,2 argued in favor of the exclusionary rule stating, "Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the government becomes the lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. "22
United States v. Leon created a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule.2 3 Under this exception, the exclusionary rule
cannot be applied to bar evidence in the state's case in chief,
although the search warrant subsequently is ruled invalid.2 4 The
rationale behind the exception is that police officers who reasonably rely in good faith on search warrants issued by neutral and
detached magistrates do not intentionally violate the Fourth
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Id. at 415.
Id.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 214.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 468 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
Id. at 897.
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Amendment. Therefore, the purpose of the exclusionary rule, to
deter police misconduct,2 5 should not apply to them.2 6
State constitutions contain search and seizure provisions
which are interpreted by state supreme courts independent of the
United States Supreme Court. At the time of the Mapp decision
in 1961, twenty-four state courts and the territories of Alaska and
Hawaii already excluded evidence illegally seized on the basis of
case law or statutes. Thus, a body of state law on the exclusionary
rule existed in each of those states and territories before 1961.
That state law was not modified by Leon.
By contrast, however, some states, such as New Hampshire,
had no statutory exclusionary rule prior to Mapp. New Hampshire, like a majority of jurisdictions, subscribed to the strict common law rule that a court must admit all competent and probative
evidence regardless of its source. Subsequent to Mapp, all state
trial courts and federal district courts applied the exclusionary
rule to enforce a national standard for police conduct in search
and seizure cases.
The rights of defendants in search and seizure law reached
apogee during the era of Chief Justice Earl Warren.28 When Warren Burger was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United Supreme
Court in 1969, many court observers anticipated a conservative,
law and order shift in the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. However, stare decisis requires courts to follow established
precedents, unless previous case holdings are reversed. Thus,
stare decisis slows change. Furthermore, a presidential appointee
to the Supreme Court does not initiate change in case law until he
or she is part of a majority on the court.
In 1977, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., signaled a method to
defense lawyers for retaining individual rights expanded by the
Warren Court, but under retrenchment by the Burger Court he
stated:
Of late, . . more and more state courts are construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as
guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the
federal provisions, even those identically phrased. This is surely
25. Id. at 916.
26. Id. at 919-20 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
27. State v. Mara, 78 A. 2d 922, 924 (N.H. 1951).
28. The Warren Court, A Retrospective (Bernard Schwartz ed., Oxford
University Press 1996).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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an important and highly significant development for our
constitu29
tional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism.
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v.
Long,3 0 set forth how state supreme court justices should write
their opinions when they are based on "bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds." 3 '
Beginning in 1983, New Hampshire, and other state supreme
courts, "in reaction to federal decisions narrowing the scope and
content of fourth amendment rights, . . . repeatedly emphasized
the importance of undertaking independent interpretation of our
State constitutional guarantees."3 2 These courts held that the
good faith exception is inconsistent with state constitutional
requirements of probable cause. 3
State appellate courts must clearly state on the face of the
opinion the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground.
When 'a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when
the adequacy and independence of any possible state law is not
clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way
34
it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.'
29. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977).
30. 463 U.S. 1032 (1982).
31. Id. at 1040-41.
32. State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1104 (N.H. 1995) (citing State v. Ball, 471
A.2d 347, 350-52 (N.H. 1983); State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1982 (N.H.
1986); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 979-80 (N.H. 1985); State v. Sidebothem,
474 A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (N.H. 1984); State v. Settle, 447 A.2d 1284, 1285-86
(N.H. 1982) (plurality opinion)) (holding that a good faith exception is
incompatible with the guarantees contained in part I, article 19 of the New
Hampshire Constitution).
33. See State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Gutierrez, 863
P.2d 1052 (1993); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988); and
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). See also, State v.
Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y.
1985); and State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991).
34. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 37 (1996) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)) (decision clearly relied on federal law rather than
Ohio Constitution). See also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 941 (1996)
(Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions rest on an incorrect reading of the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and the adequacy and independence
of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/3
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A HYPOTHETICAL 35

The moon rises slowly as two men busily transfer contraband
drugs from the stash house into the trunk of a late model Cadillac.
The Miami drug lord fingers the trigger of his UZI machine gun as
he surveys the scene, located somewhere between the Miami
International Airport and Hialeah Park Race Track. After receiving their delivery schedule and telephone numbers, the two
"mules" drive off to the east until they arrive at Interstate 95, the
"Golden Alley." They turn north and set the cruise control. Within
twelve hours they will deliver cocaine in six states: Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and New Jersey.
These foreign nationals have not read the United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, or the constitutions of the six states in
which they will make deliveries. They do know, however, that if
stopped they are not to speak English except to ask for a lawyer.
This hypothetical assumes that in a city in each of the six
states, the following occurs: On that same night a confidential
informant of unproven reliability informs an officer of the (insert
city) police department that two persons known to him as
"Armando" and "Patsy" are selling large quantities of cocaine from
their residence at 620 Noveau Riche Drive in downtown (insert
name of same city). The informant also indicates that he witnessed a sale of cocaine by Patsy at the residence approximately
five months earlier. At that time, he saw a shoe box containing a
large amount of cash that belonged to Patsy. He says that
Armando and Patsy generally keep only small quantities of drugs
at their residence and store the remainder at another location in
(insert name of same city). The police put Armando and Patsy
under surveillance and determine that the cars parked at the
Noveau Riche residence belong to Armando Sanchez, who previously has been arrested for possession of cocaine, and Patsy Stewart, who has no criminal record. That night officers observe a late
model Cadillac arrive at the Noveau Riche Drive residence. Two
males exit the vehicle and walk into the residence. Each man
holds a small package which resembles a fast food restaurant bag.
A quick check of the license tag number through the police information network reveals that the Cadillac is owned by Richard
Castle, who has been arrested previously for possession of fifty
pounds of marijuana. Officers see another automobile arrive. A
35. These facts are designed to resemble the factual situation in United States
v.Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).-
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male exits this automobile, rushes inside the residence at 620
Noveau Riche Drive, and shortly thereafter leaves carrying a
small paper sack. Activity increases. At two a.m., after all area
businesses have closed, three more automobiles arrive. The occupants rush inside the 620 Noveau Riche Drive residence and leave
holding paper bags. The police recognize one of those persons as a
probationer with prior drug involvement.
While officers continue to keep the residence under surveillance, one officer rushes to a magistrate. The officer presents an
affidavit reciting the information obtained from the confidential
informant, the officers' personal observations at 620 Noveau Riche
Drive, and the record checks obtained. The magistrate issues a
search warrant to search the house and vehicles at 629 Noveau
Riche Drive, (insert name of city), for controlled substances. The
affidavit contains no facts indicating the basis for the informant's
statements concerning prior criminal activity and is devoid of
information establishing the informant's reliability.
The officer returns to the scene with the search warrant and
all officers search the house and the Cadillac. The officers seize
two kilos of cocaine in the house at 620 Noveau Riche Drive and
eight kilos of cocaine in the trunk of the Cadillac, all wrapped in
fast food restaurant bags.
Armando, Patsy and the two "mules" are arrested inside the
house and exercise their right to remain silent. Appointed counsel
files a motion to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that the
search warrant was not supported by probable cause.
How does this hypothetical impact state constitutional law?
To answer that question it is necessary to examine the evidence at
the suppression hearing through the lens of the state trial judge in
each state. The hypothetical assumes that each defendant has
standing to object to the admissibility of at least part of the
cocaine.
As we trace this hypothetical journey from state to state, we
will examine the legal response of state trial court judges based on
search and seizure provisions in state constitutions, state statutes
and case law. The state trial court judge will look first to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The state trial judge in each case determines that the search
warrant is defective under the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the search warrant,
because there was no proof of the credibility of the informant and
his information was stale. However, the trial judge knows that
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/3
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suppressing the evidence will have no deterrent effect on the
police. The police officer who obtained the search warrant was
well-trained and relied on the search warrant in objective good
faith. The ruling in United States v. Leon would indicate that the
motion to suppress should be denied. 6
The trial judge will attempt to determine if the motion to suppress can be allowed on "adequate and independent" state
grounds. The method of analysis is analytical and comparative. It
is a useful method, because it studies the disparate responses to
the issue by six state supreme courts.
This article follows the hypothetical pair northward from
Florida to New Jersey, evaluating state constitutional law, state
statutory law and state case law, looking for inconsistencies and
anomalies. Interestingly, we begin with an anomaly: the search
and seizure provision of the Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
III.

FLORIDA

Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution, as amended
in 1982, effective January 3, 1983, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be
issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or
persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be
intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or
information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United

construingthe 4th Amendment to the United
States Supreme Court
37
States Constitution.

The 1982 amendment to Article I, Section 12, of the Florida
Constitution appears in italics type. This 1982 amendment was
adopted by vote of the electorate at the November, 1982 general
election. The other part of Article I, Section 12 appeared without
36. See supra notes 23-26.
37. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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substantial difference in all the prior Florida Constitutions.3 s
Prior to passage of this amendment, Florida courts "were free to
provide its citizens with a higher standard of protection from governmental intrusion than that afforded by the Federal
Constitution. ,

39

Section 933.18 of the Florida Statutes governs the issuance of
a search warrant for a private home and provides:
No search warrant shall issue under this chapter or under
any other law of this state to search any private dwelling occupied
as such unless:

(5) The law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being violated
therein;
No warrant shall be issued for the search of any private
dwelling under any of the conditions hereinabove mentioned
...

except on sworn proof by affidavit of some credible witness that he
has reason to believe that one of said conditions exists, which affi-

davit shall set forth the facts on which such reason for belief is
based.4 °
State v. Lavazzoli 4 ' interpreted the 1982 amendment to Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution as linking Florida's
exclusionary rule to the federal exclusionary rule.4 2 Thus, the
good faith exception to the search warrant requirement as set out
in United States v. Leon 43 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard"
became the law in Florida.
With this amendment, however, we are bound to follow the
interpretations of the United States Supreme Court with relation
to the Fourth Amendment, and provide no greater protection than
those interpretations. Indeed, an exclusionary rule that was once
constitutionally mandated in Florida can now be eliminated by
judicial decision of the United States Supreme Court.45
The effect of making the exclusionary rule a part of the Florida Constitution in 1968 was to give the existing exclusionary rule
38. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 7 (1968); FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 7
(1968); FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 7 (1968); FLA. CONST. of 1868, decl. of

rights, § 19 (1968).
39. State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. 1983).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

FLA. STAT. CH. 933.18 (1985).
434 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1983).
Id. at 323.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
468 U.S. 981 (1984).
State v. Bernie, 524 So.2d 988, 990-91 (Fla. 1988).
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constitutional dimension, supposedly immunizirig it from possible
future retreat from the United States Supreme Court's constitutional holding in Mapp.
However, with the Bernie decision in 1988, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the language of the amended Article I,
Section 12 of the Florida Constitution indicated an intention to
apply all United States Supreme Court decisions to Florida search
and seizure cases regardless of when rendered.4 6 In Bernie,
Emery Air Freight received an envelope addressed to Vickie
Bernie.4 7 The envelope had broken in transit, revealing a suspicious substance.48 Emery notified a drug enforcement agent, who
tested the substance and identified it as cocaine. 4 9 Emery then
notified the Sarasota County Sheriffs Office.50 Bruce Bernie came
to Emery's Tampa office to check on the whereabouts of the package, and Emery's employees told him that the package would be
delivered the next day, October 14, 1983.51 On October 14, 1983,
based on an affidavit setting forth the preceding facts, the police
obtained a search warrant for the Bernies' residence. 52 Probable
cause was based on the prospective delivery of cocaine under
police control.5 3 A few minutes after the controlled delivery, police
executed the search warrant at the residence, arrested the
Bernies, and charged them with possession of cocaine.5 4
The Bernies moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds
that it was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure,
relying on the provisions of Section 933.18, Florida Statutes.5 5
The Bernies contended that at the time the search warrant was
issued there was no violation of any narcotics law in their
dwelling.5 6
Nevertheless, the court in Bernie held that the anticipatory
search warrant issued was valid and did not violate the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section
12 of the Florida Constitution or Section 933.18 of the Florida
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 991.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bernie, 524 So.2d at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 990.
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Statutes. 7 Bernie also held that the 1982 amendment to Article I,
Section 12, of the Florida Constitution conformed Florida's search
and seizure laws with all decisions of the United States Supreme
Court rendered before and subsequent to the adoption of that
amendment. (emphasis added).5"
In 1989, one year after Bernie, a Florida appellate court in
Renckley v. Florida5 9 found an anticipatory search warrant invalid under Section 933.18.60 The good faith exception argument of
the State failed because the affidavit did not provide sufficient evidence for a magistrate to find probable cause to issue a search
warrant. 6 ' Therefore, the officer's search of the dwelling was not
in "objectively reasonable reliance" on the warrant.6 2
More recently, the 1995 case of Pazos v. Florida63 applied the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in an anticipatory
search case.64 Technically, no narcotics or drug abuse law was
being violated when the magistrate issued the search warrant.65
The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the magistrate's finding of probable cause.6 6 The informant had bought
drugs before from the occupants of the dwelling. 67 "[T]he officers
had the informant in sight constantly except while he was inside
the dwelling."68 "IT]here was a firm connection between the contraband and the premises." 69 The affidavit contained no false
statements. 7° The motion to suppress under Florida Statutes Section 933.18 (5) was denied. 7 '
In Florida, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision; whether given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the "veracity"
and the "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay infor57. Bernie, 524 So.2d at 992.
58. Id.
59. 538 So.2d 1340 (Fla. 1989).
60. Id at 1342.
61. Id at 1342-43.
62. Id. at 1343.
63. 654 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1995).
64. Id. at 1001.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pazos, 654 So.2d at 1001.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1000.
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mation, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place. "[Tihe duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed"
considering the totality of the circumstances.7 2
State v. Wildes 73 applied the good faith exception enunciated
in United States v. Leon when the information in the affidavit was
obtained by a police officer from an unidentified confidential
informant. 74 "The affidavit contained no specific facts regarding
the reliability of the informant although the facts themselves contained considerable detail indicating the presence of contraband
at the residence authorized to be searched."7 5 The Court applied
the good faith exception, noting that the search warrant was regular on its face.7 6 It also noted that "the affidavit upon which [the
search warrant] was based was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officer executing the warrant could not with
reasonable objectivity rely in good faith on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the
warrant."

77

Floridav. Kingston7 applied the Leon good faith exception in
1993, even though the judge issued a search warrant, in which he
had drawn a diagonal line across a blank space where the description of the place to be searched was omitted.7 9 The detective
believed the judge had corrected whatever was wrong.8 0 A nine
page affidavit was stapled to the search warrant."' Apparently,
when read in a common sense, non-technical way, the search warrant set forth ample facts to establish probable cause and enable
the searcher, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be
searched. 2 In Florida, "the test is practical accuracy, not technical nicety."8 3
72. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (citing Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
73. 468 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1985).
74. Id. at 550-51.
75. Id. at 550
76. Id. at 551.
77. Id. See also State v. Harris, 629 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1993).
78. 617 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1993).
79. Id. at 415.
80. Id. at 416.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 415.
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In the 1996 case of Florida v. Howard, 4 the search warrant
stated that facts showing probable cause were set forth in a written affidavit.8 5 The search warrant failed to incorporate by reference the facts in the affidavit.8 6 However, the court deemed the
search warrant valid, because evidence at the suppression hearing
suggested the affidavit had been attached to the warrant and had
been reviewed by the issuing judge.
Florida courts have refused to follow the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule in some cases. In State v. Ross,8 8 a search
warrant, due to a word processing error, neglected to include a
description of specific property for which the search was authorized.8 9 The search warrant was facially invalid. 90 The executing
officer could not reasonably have presumed the search warrant to
have been valid. 9 1 Therefore, the State could not resort to the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated in United
93
States v. Leon.9 2 The next year, the court in Vasquez v. State
refused to apply the good faith exception, because the affidavit for
a search warrant contained no information about the informant's
credibility and no independent police corroboration. 94 No officer
could in objective good faith rely on the search warrant.9 5 In
Delacruz v. Florida,96 the affidavit for a search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, because it contained no information about the reliability of the confidential informant.97
The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does
not apply to the exclusionary provisions of the Florida wiretap law
set out in chapter 934, Florida Statutes. The statutorily mandated exclusionary rule in "[clhapter 934, Florida Statutes, pertaining to security of communications, unequivocally expresses
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

670 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1996).
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1005-06.
471 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984)).
Id.
491 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 500 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1986).
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300.
603 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1992).
Id. at 707.
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the Legislature's desire to suppress evidence obtained in violation
98
of that chapter."
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial,
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. 99
Florida state courts have adopted the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule in accordance with the 1982 amendment to
Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution. Prior to 1983,
the exclusionary rule was a state constitutional provision. The
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as set forth in Leon,
became state law in Florida by virtue of the language in Article I,
Section 12, of the Florida Constitution: "This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court."
In the hypothetical discussed in section II of this article, the
state trial judge's order allowing the motion to suppress would be
reversed by the Florida appellate courts. Thus, Armando and
Patsy would likely be convicted in Florida.
IV. GEORGIA
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.' 0 0
The Georgia state constitutional provision on search and
seizure has not impacted analysis by the Georgia Supreme Court
of the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. That is
not to say that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies in Georgia state courts.
The federal exclusionary rule, applicable only when evidence
has been seized pursuant to an unlawful search, operates as "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect . . ."11 Any
98.
99.
100.
101.

State v. Garcia, 547 So.2d 628, 630 (Fla. 1989).
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. CH. 934.06 (1985)).
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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exception to the federal exclusionary rule arises only when evidence has been seized pursuant to an unlawful search. In Leon,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction in the State's case in chief of
"evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that
ultimately found to be invalid."1 °2
The Leon "good faith exception" does not apply in Georgia.
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA) section 17-5-30 is
Georgia's exclusionary rule.'0 3 The Georgia state legislature has
mandated the exclusionary rule in OCGA section 17-5-30.104 "By
its terms, OCGA section 17-5-30 authorizes no exception to Georgia's exclusionary rule when evidence has been seized unlawfully.
OCGA section 17-5-30 (a)(1) and (2) clearly provides that '[a]
defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure was entitled to suppression of the evidence regardless of whether the
unlawful search and seizure was accomplished with or without a

warrant.'

"105

By passage in 1966 of an act "to provide for searches and
seizures and for suppression of evidence illegally seized" the State
of Georgia has chosen to impose greater requirements upon its
law enforcement officers than that required by the U.S. Constitu10 6
tion, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
OCGA section 17-5-30(a)(2) applies in situations where it is
alleged that a search conducted pursuant to a search warrant was
unlawful because the search warrant itself was either insufficient
on its face, was issued without probable cause, or was illegally
executed.
In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes
the probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, Georgia
courts employ the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, and adopted by Georgia in State v. Stephens, with the admonition that '[pirudence counsels that Gates
be considered as the outer limit of probable cause.' Under that
102. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 897 (1984).
103. See State v. Slaughter, 315 S.E.2d 865, 870 (Ga. 1984); and King v. State,
438 S.E.2d 93, 94-95 (Ga. App. 1993).
104. See Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1992); and Hestley v. State,
455 S.E.2d 333, 340 (Ga. App. 1995).
105. State v. Harvey, 469 S.E.2d 176, 178 (Ga. 1996).
106. Gary, 422 S.E.2d at 428 (noting that "[olur decision in this case is based
on our construction of OCGA § 17-5-30").
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analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty
of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause
07
existed.1
Georgia law does allow a defendant to plead guilty, reserving
the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress. 0
Prior to the Georgia Supreme Court ruling in Gary on November 5, 1992, some Georgia appellate cases had approved and utilized the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 0 9
Interestingly, in Adams v. State,110 Chief Judge Carley was careful to-specify: "[ilt should be pointed out that the State Constitution and state law are not involved.""' Furthermore, some of the
cases 1 12 mistakenly cite State v. Stringer.1"1 In Stringer, Chief
Justice Marshall referred to the Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in dictum." 4 The holding in Stringer did not
adopt the Leon good faith exception rule." 5
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Leon,
which judicially creates a "good faith"
exception the exclusionary rule, does not apply in Georgia,
because Georgia's exclusionary rule is legislatively created. The
state statute, OCGA section 17-5-30, imposes greater requirements upon Georgia law enforcement officers than that required
107. Id. at 429-30.
108. See State v. McCullough, 438 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. App. 1993); Mims v. State,
410 S.E.2d 824 (Ga. App. 1991).
109. Taylor v. State, 419 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Ga. App. 1992); Talley v. State, 408
S.E.2d 463, 465-466 (Ga. App. 1991); State v. Morris, 402 S.E.2d 288, 290 (Ga.
App. 1991); Adams v. State, 383 S.E.2d 378, 379-380 (Ga. App. 1989); State v.
Evans, 384 S.E.2d 404, 409 (Ga. App. 1989); Debey v. State, 385 S.E.2d 694 (Ga.
App. 1989).
110. 383 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. App. 1989).
111. Id. at 380.
112. See supra note 110.
113. 372 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1988).
114. Id. at 606.
115. Id. at 606-07.
116. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Leon. The
Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has not been
applied in Georgia state courts since the Georgia Supreme Court
ruling in Gary on November 5, 1992. These state courts, using
adequate and independent state grounds, have resolved search
and seizure questions in total reliance on the state statute without
considering Leon.
In the absence of drug evidence in the hypothetical set out in
section II of this article, Armando and Patsy would not be tried or
the case would be dismissed at the close of the State's evidence.
V.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, the person or thing to be seized, and the information to
be obtained.
The present version of Article I, section 10 was adopted in 1971.
South Carolina Statute section 17-13-140 provides:
Any magistrate or recorder or city judge of any court of record of
the State having jurisdiction over the area where the property
sought is located, may issue a search warrant to search for and
seize .... (5) any narcotic drugs, barbiturates, amphetamines or
other drugs restricted to sale, possession, or use on prescription
only, which are manufactured, possessed, controlled, sold, prescribed, administered, dispensed or compounded in violation of
any of the laws of this State or of the United States.... A warrant
issued hereunder shall be issued only upon affidavit sworn to
before the magistrate, municipal judicial officer, or judge of a court
of record establishing the grounds for the warrant. If the magistrate, municipal judge, or other judicial officer above mentioned is
satisfied that the grounds for the application exist or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant
identifying the property and naming or describing the person or
place to be searched.
The constitutional prohibition against the issuance of a warrant except "upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation" is not a grant of power. It is part and parcel of the historic
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/3
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provision securing the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures and its only office is to prescribe minimum standards for
the issuance of a warrant. The requirement of an affidavit complies with these standards and is a procedural detail. The determination of whether or not there is probable cause must be made
by the officer empowered to issue the search warrant, and not by a
police officer or other individual who seeks the warrant. 11 7 A trial
court, in reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause, may
not consider information which was not set forth in the affidavit
unless the search warrant specifies that a sworn oral statement
was presented to the magistrate. 118 An appellate court reviewing
the decision to issue a search warrant should decide whether the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed. If the search warrant affidavit does not show a reliable confidential informant, then the magistrate cannot find probable cause to issue the search warrant." 9
In determining the existence of probable cause, a non-confidential informant possesses a higher level of credibility because
and criminal
he exposes himself to public view and to possible civil
120
liability should the information prove to be false.
A 1991 case, State v. Scott, 121 held that a search warrant affidavit articulated sufficient probable cause for the magistrate to
issue a search warrant to search the defendant's home. 1 2 2 In
Scott, the affidavit stated that investigators saw the defendant
leave his residence; stopped the defendant; the defendant possessed more than twenty grams of cocaine; and the investigators
from the time he
maintained visual contact with the defendant
123
stop.
the
of
time
the
until
left his residence
If a search warrant affidavit alone is insufficient to establish
probable cause, it may be supplemented before the magistrate by
sworn oral testimony. 12 4 However, sworn oral testimony, standing
1 25
alone, does not satisfy South Carolina's search warrant statute.
In State v. McKnight, a 1987 case, the officers were aware of the
statutory requirement that an affidavit support a search warrant,
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

State v. York, 156 S.E.2d 326 (S.C. 1967).
State v. Arnold, 460 S.E.2d 403 (S.C. 1995).
State v. Philpot, 454 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 1995).
State v.Bellamy, 473 S.E.2d 838 (S.C. 1996).
State v. Scott, 400 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 786.
Id. at 785-786.
State v. McKnight, 352 S.E.2d 471, 472 (S.C. 1987).
S.C. Code Ann. §17-13-140 (Law Co-op. 1985).
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but made no effort to comply.' 2 6 Thus, the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule did not apply when the search warrant was
adjudged defective under section 17-13-140 of the South Carolina
code, rather than on Fourth Amendment grounds. 127 Leon did not
apply. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that exclusion of
12
the evidence was appropriate.
In State v. Johnson,'2 9 a 1990 case, the affidavit in support of
the search warrant was insufficient to support the magistrate's
determination of probable cause. 130 In Johnson, the confidential
informant's allegations were not corroborated and the reliability
of the informant was not set forth.' 3 ' This case was remanded to
the trial court. 1 3 2 The South Carolina Supreme Court felt that the
dispositive issue was whether sworn oral testimony about the
informant's reliability was presented to the magistrate. 1 33 Ifsuch
information was not given, then the Johnson court felt that the
magistrate in this case would have served only as a "rubber
stamp" for the police rather than as a neutral and detached official.'
Under such circumstances, Leon would specifically pre13 5
clude application of the good faith exception.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals, in the 1994 case, State
v. Adolphe, 3 6 reversed the trial judge's ruling that the Leon good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. 1 3 7 The confidential informant, Richard "Tex" Chung, made a controlled buy of
crack at a trailer. 138 Michael Donnell, a man unknown to and not
assisting the police at that time, went with Chung into the trailer
and acted as an intermediary in the buy.1 39 After the buy, Chung
met with his supervising officer, turned over the crack and gave a
detailed description of the man who had sold the crack to him. 14 0
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

McKnight, 352 S.E.2d at 471.
Id. at 473.
Id.
State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 167 (S.C. 1990).
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Adolphe, 441 S.E.2d 832 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 834.
Id. at 833.
Id.
Id
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Immediately after receiving the crack from Chung, Officer Young
obtained a search warrant for the trailer.1 4 1 Police went to the
trailer and arrested several people, including Donnell. 1 42 Donnell
offered to help the police, stating that Adolphe had fled to
Adolphe's "stash house. "14 Donnell led police to the alleged
house, where the police entered with the consent of one of the
occupants.'4 The police arrested Adolphe as he was trying to
escape out the back door. 14 5 Adolphe matched the description of
the man who had made the sale to Chung, and Donnell identified
Adolphe as the person who sold the crack at the trailer. 1 46 Minutes later, an officer arrived at the stash house with a search warrant. 14 7 Officer Young had obtained the information for the search
warrant from a radio transmission which he and the magistrate
14 8
monitored via a police radio at the magistrate's office.
The affidavit of Officer Young stated:
An individual positively identified by a confidential informant as
having sold crack cocaine to the confidential informant within the
last 48 hours and being observed by drug agents fleeing the location of the previous bust, was located at this location within minutes after fleeing previous location on the night of 1-2, October,
1991. C.I. and others describe this residence as a stash house
where money and 1 drugs
are stored after sale from previous loca49
tion is completed.
The trial court found that the search warrant was deficient on its
face and conducted a suppression hearing. 150 At the hearing the
only witness was the afflant, Officer Young.'
Young's testimony
only established that Donnell was the person who positively identified Adolphe. 15 2 Although Young's testimony did not cure the
deficiencies in the search warrant, the trial court denied the
defense's motion to suppress, applying the Leon good faith excep141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Adolphe, 441 S.E.2d at 833.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adolphe, 441 S.E.2d at 833.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id.
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tion to the exclusionary rule. 153 The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, applying the Gates151 "totality of the circumstances
test."1

55

The Court of Appeals concluded that the search warrant

should not have been issued because the affidavit, coupled with
the suppression hearing, failed to supply facts creating probable
cause.' 5 6 The Adolphe court stated that the "affidavit did not
demonstrate the confidential informant's reliability and the
informant's allegations were never corroborated by any identifiable individuals." 5 7 The Court went on to say that "our Supreme
Court (South Carolina) declined to apply the good faith exception
if the underlying affidavit does not include sufficient information
to allow a magistrate to determine probable cause." 158
In State v Austin, 159 decided in 1991, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that marijuana seized pursuant to a defective search warrant was not admissible under the Leon good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. 160 Crucial to this case were the
facts that the officer testified at the suppression hearing that he
actually knew that the affidavit was insufficient and that the affidavit, itself, contained no information about the reliability of the
informant. 16 1 Consequently, the Court held that the1 62officer did
not act in reasonable reliance on the search warrant.
In conclusion, South Carolina Constitution Article I, section
10 closely resembles the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Article I, section 10 does contain a specific phrase prohibiting unreasonable invasions of privacy that is not in the Fourth
Amendment. The South Carolina Constitution and South Carolina Statute section 17-13-140 governing searches and seizures
both require a finding of probable cause by a judicial official for a
search warrant to issue. As a matter of state criminal procedure
developed by state case law, magistrates may consider sworn oral
statements to supplement affidavits in determining probable
153. Id.
154. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
155. Adolphe, 441 S.E.2d at 834.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 167, 170 (S.C. 1990) and State v.
Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
159. Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
160. Id. at 816.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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cause. 16 3 At suppression hearings, trial courts may conduct suppression hearings to determine what sworn oral statements a
magistrate considered in finding probable cause. Few appellate
cases in South Carolina discuss the Leon good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.' 6 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has
declined to apply the Leon good faith exception if the underlying
affidavit does not include sufficient information to allow a magistrate to determine probable cause. 165
South Carolina appellate courts would affirm the state trial
judge's order allowing the motion to suppress in our hypothetical.
Armando and Patsy would not face trial in South Carolina, or if
tried, a motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case would be
allowed.
VI.

NORTH CAROLINA

Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution
provides:
General warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose
offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence,
1 66
are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the
search and seizure provision of its state constitution, Article I,
Section 20, to provide broader rights than those required by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In State v.
Carter,1 67 a 1988 case, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused
68
to adopt the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis in the Carter case
specifically addresses "adequate and independent" state constitutional grounds:
Because we decide this case on adequate and independent
state constitutional grounds, we do not reach or decide the question of whether the challenged search violated defendant's fourth
and fourteenth amendment rights under the Federal Constitution.
163. State v. McKnight, 352 S.E.2d 471, 472 (S.C. 1987).
164. State v. Adolphe, 441 S.E.2d 832, 834 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
165. Austin, 409 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d
167 (S.C. 1990).
166. N.C. CONST. ART. 1, § 20.
167. State v. Carter 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988).
168. Id. at 562.
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The federal cases cited or discussed are being used only for the
purpose of guidance6 9and they do not compel the result that this
Court has reached.'
Justice Martin, writing for a four to three majority in Carter,
recognized that the language in Article I, Section 20 of the North
Carolina Constitution differs somewhat from that of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. To emphasize the
court's inherent power to decide the case solely on the state constitution, Justice Martin stated: "Even were the two provisions identical, we have the authority to construe our own constitution
differently from the construction by the United States Supreme
Court of the Federal Constitution, as long as our citizens are
thereby accorded no lesser rights than they are guaranteed by the
parallel federal provision."170
The position of the North Carolina Supreme Court is not surprising. The North Carolina General Assembly enacted a statutory exclusionary rule in 1937, North Carolina General Statute
section 15-37, some twenty five years before Mapp17 1 mandated
that the states apply the exclusionary rule under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Elkins v. U.S.,172 the
famous "silver platter" decision in 1960, listed North Carolina as
one of twenty six states that excluded evidence illegally seized by
state officers. 173 Prior to Elkins, evidence illegally seized by state
officers was admissible in federal trials; thus the evidence was
said to be handed over to federal officers by state officers on a "silver platter."
The North Carolina General Assembly amended the statute
adopting the exclusionary rule in 1951 to extend the rule to apply
to warrantless searches. 74 The amended statute was repealed in
1969 and replaced, effective 1975, by North Carolina General
Statute section 15A-974 which provides in part: "[ulpon timely
motion, evidence must be suppressed if: (1) Its exclusion is
required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina. " 17 5 The General Assembly of
169. Id. at 555 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Jackson v.
Housing Authority 364 S.E.2d 416 (N.C. 1988)).
170. Carter, 370 S.E.2d at 555 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
and State v. Arrington 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984)).
171. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
172. Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
173. Id. at 224 (citing State v. Mills 98 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 1957)).
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-37 (1957) (repealed 1969).
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974(1) (1973).
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North Carolina sets the public policy of the state. Since 1937, the
expressed public policy of North Carolina has been to exclude evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in violation of state or
federal constitutional rights.
The exclusionary rule continues to be a debated issue in
North Carolina, though its legal status is clearly established when
the court rules only on the basis of state constitutional law. The
Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was approved in
1988 in State v. WelchI7 6 and State v. Witherspoon, 7 7 when the
court applied federal constitutional law. Unquestionably, Welch
has been overruled by Carter. Both Welch and Carter involved
officers obtaining blood samples from persons in custody using
non-testimonial identification orders rather than search
warrants. 78
In State v. Hyleman,' 7 9 a 1988 case, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals used the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule to uphold the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Martin, reversed the Court of
Appeals.'8 0 The North Carolina Supreme Court did not reach the
federal constitutional question. The Court found that the affidavit
and application for a search warrant failed to comply with the
state search and seizure statute, North Carolina General statute
section 15A-244.111 Justice Martin's opinion reasoned: "[hiaving
decided upon statutory grounds that defendant's motion to suppress should have been allowed, this Court will not decide the
same issue on constitutional grounds .... It follows that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule is not applicable. The
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule arises upon the
exclusion of evidence based upon federal constitutional
grounds."182
Justice Mitchell's dissent in Carter, vigorously attacked the
rationale used by the majority in Carter and subsequently in
Hyleman. In his dissent in Carter Justice Mitchell stated:
176.
177.
178.
179.
(N.C.
180.
181.
182.

State v. Welch, 342 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 1986).
State v. Witherspoon, 429 S.E.2d 783 (N.C. App. 1993).
Welch, 342 S.E.2d at 793; Carter, 429,S.E.2d at 554.
State v. Hyleman, 366 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. App. 1988), rev'd, 379 S.E.2d 830
1989).
Hyleman, 379 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 1989).
Id. at 833.
Id.
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In the context of cases such as this, the majority's doctrinaire
application of our exclusionary rule truly becomes a 'mere technicality' applied with a vengeance to block enforcement of the criminal laws for no good reason. Application of the exclusionary rule
here will not deter any future misconduct by anyone or lessen the
likelihood of future infringements upon anyone's constitutional
rights. The only effect of the majority's rejection of a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in cases such as this is to punish
the public by impeding the truth-finding function of its courts.
This drastic choice by the majority does not lead to any corresponding societal or constitutional gain for anyone other than
criminal defendants lucky enough to have officers make honest
errors in their cases. This diminishes the integrity of the judicial
branch of government.' 8 3
Furthermore, Justice Meyer additional dissent in Carter contended that there is no reason for the court to find there to be
different exclusionary standards under the North Carolina Constitution than the United States Constitution. s4 Justice Meyer
wrote that "a dual set of rules and exclusionary standards will create a burdensome set of highly sophisticated rules which in no
way furthers the objectives of the Fourth Amendment or Article I,
Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution."8 5
In conclusion, when North Carolina State Courts evaluate
motions to suppress, their rulings depend on whether the courts
rely on "adequate and independent" state grounds. Since there is
no Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Article I,
Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, Carter. Armando
and Patsy's motion to suppress in a North Carolina court would
begranted.
VII.

VIRGINIA

The Virginia State Constitution provides:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence,
are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.18 6
183.
184.
185.
186.

State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 565 (N.C. 1988) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 567(Meyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
VA. CONST. ART. 1, § 10.
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General warrants are proscribed by both the Fourth Amendment18 7 and Virginia's statutory law.' 88 The purpose of this proscription is to limit the discretion police officers may exercise
when engaging in a "fishing expedition" or an "exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." 8 9 To protect against this danger, the Fourth Amendment requires "a particular description of
the thing to be seized." 19 0 The Virginia statutes controlling the
issuance of search warrants have been interpreted to impose the
same search warrant requirements as the Fourth Amendment. 19 '
Virginia magistrates have an additional incentive to exercise
care in the issuance of search warrants. Section 19.2-55 of Virginia's code provides that "any person having authority to issue
criminal warrants who willfully and knowingly issues a general
search warrant or a search warrant without the affidavit required
by Section 19.2-54 shall be deemed guilty of a malfeasance." 9 2
The Fourth Amendment specifically mandates that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation."' 9 3 Article I, Section 10 of the Virginia Constitution
prohibits a general search of "suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed."' 9 4 Although the words, "probable cause," do
not appear in the search and seizure provision of the Virginia
State Constitution, the words "probable cause" in the Fourth
Amendment came from a Virginia document. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776, rebelled against the practice of police control taking the place of judicial control.
Virginia Code Section 19.2-45(2) gives magistrates the power
to issue search warrants in accord with the provisions of Sections
19.2-52 to 19.2-60.115 Section 19.2-52 provides that:
search warrants, based upon complaint on oath supported by an
affidavit as required in Section 19.2-54, may be issued by any
judge, magistrate or other person having authority to issue criminal warrants, if he be satisfied from such complaint and affidavit
187. Andresen v. Maryland, 421 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54 (Michie 1987).
189. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
190. U.S. CONST., AMEND. IV.
191. Kirby v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E.2d 411, 412 (Va. 1969); Morke v.
Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 410 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-55 (Michie 1975).
193. U.S. CONST. , AMEND. IV.
194. VA. CONST. ART. 1, § 10.
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-45(2) (Michie 1985).
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that there is reasonable and probable cause for the issuance of
9 6
such search warrant.'
Section 19.2-54 of the Virginia Code specifies the essential
requirements of the affidavit:
No search warrant shall be issued until there is filed with the
officer authorized to issue the same an affidavit of some person
reasonably describing the place, thing, or person to be searched,
the things or persons to be searched for thereunder, alleging
briefly material facts, constituting the probable cause for the issuance of such warrant and alleging substantially the offense in
relation to which such search is to be made and that the object,
thing or person searched for constitutes evidence of the commission of such offense.... No warrant shall be issued on an affidavit
omitting such essentials, and no general warrant for the search of
a house, place, compartment, vehicle or baggage shall be issued.
The term 'affidavit' as used in this section, means statements
9 7
made under oath or affirmation and presented verbatim.'
Virginia courts have applied common sense to the reasonableness requirement of probable cause. 9 " Probable cause is a nontechnical concept. 199 Probable cause is based on probabilities, not
legal technicalities.2 0 The "totality of the circumstances" test set
forth in Gates2 0 1 should be evaluated by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men
rely.2 °2 Virginia magistrates and other judicial officials evaluating probable cause for the issuance of search warrants under the
Fourth Amendment and state constitutional search and seizure
provisions have to apply their best analysis and common sense to
an infinite variety of factual situations. 2 03 Virginia appellate
courts have made a policy decision that when an affidavit for a
search warrant provides evidence sufficient to create a disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence
of probable cause, then the officers could have harbored an objec196. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-55 (Michie 1986).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54 (Michie 1989).
198. Derr v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E. 2d 662, 666 (Va. 1991).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231.
202. Derr, 410 S.E.2d at 666.
203. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
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tively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause to support the search warrant.2 0 4
Virginia courts have adopted the good faith exception to the
search warrant requirement as set forth in Leon.2 °5 If a search
warrant was erroneously issued by a magistrate but reasonably
relied on by a law enforcement officer, there could be no deterrent
value in excluding the evidence seized.2 °6 The deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule "is absent where an officer, acting in objective good faith, obtains a search warrant from a magistrate and
acts within the scope of the warrant."2 °7 In the 1995 case of
Robinson v. Commonwealth,2 0 8 the officer swore in an affidavit
that he knew the defendant was selling drugs from his motel room
and that the officer had consulted with an expert in hotel-motel
drug distribution.2 0 9 The magistrate issued a search warrant, and
the officer reasonably relied on the search warrant and acted in
objective good faith. 210 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that
the evidence found during a search of the defendant's motel room
was admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.

211

Trial court scrutiny of the sufficiency of an affidavit to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant does not
take the form of de novo review in Virginia.2 1 2 The magistrate's
determination of probable cause is paid great deference by the
reviewing court.21 3 The United States Supreme Court has held,
however, that on appeal, a trial court's determinations as to
whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement
officers had reasonable suspicion to stop persons and probable
cause to make a warrantless search, are to be reviewed de novo,
rather than "deferentially" and "for clear error."214 When an affidavit contains a detailed description of the nature of the offense,
the premises to be searched, the items for which officers are
204. Tart v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
205. See McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 1984); Derr v.
Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 662 (Va. 1991).
206. Tart, 437 S.E.2d at 222.
207. Derr, 410 S.E. 2d at 667.
208. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 453 S.E.2d 916 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
209. Id. at 917.
210. Id. at 918-919.
211. Id. at 919.
212. Tart v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 219, 221 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
213. Id.
214. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
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searching, and the transaction which led the informant to believe
drugs would be in the apartment, then the affidavit is sufficient
for a reasonably well-trained police officer to believe that probable
cause exists. Evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based
on such an affidavit, even if the affidavit is defective, is admissible
in Virginia under the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.

2 15

Trial courts should be alert to the staleness of the information
in the affidavit. When an affidavit contains information that a
confidential informant was in a motel room where drugs were
present within the past seventy-two hours, that information is not
so stale that a magistrate cannot find probable cause to issue a
search warrant.2 16 Virginia courts have noticed that the phrase
"within the past seventy-two hours" is often used to protect the
identity of confidential informants.2 17
Virginia statutes allow a defendant the right to have a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to
a search warrant.21 s If the motion to suppress is denied, the
defendant can plead guilty and challenge the denial of the motion
to suppress on appeal.21 9
In a dissenting opinion in Tart, J. Benton argued that "[A]
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those the United States Supreme
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."2 20 "The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant

may be determined by the legislature as a matter of state law and
may 'impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required' under federal law."22 1 Judge Benton contended that the

Virginia Code does not allow a search to be made with a search
warrant absent probable cause, stating that:
If a search and seizure are made pursuant to a warrant and in
the absence of probable cause, the legislature has provided a statutory right to suppress the seized evidence. See Code Section
19.2-60. Thus, Virginia law provides an adequate and independent ground for excluding the fruits of this search. (Emphasis
215. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 179, 180 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
216. See Tart , 437 S.E.2d at 221-222.
217. Id. at 222.
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60 (Michie 1970).
219. Cherry v. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 574 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
220. Tart, 437 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).
221. Tart, 437 S.E.2d at 229 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967)).
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added) .... In addition, federal case law does not control the inter-

pretation or application of the Virginia suppression statute. The
Virginia warrant statute does not codify 'good faith' as an exception to the probable cause requirement. In the absence of a legislative expression that 'good faith' is an exception to the statutory
command, decisions by the courts in Virginia that infuse the Leon
good faith exception into the statute constitute judicial legislation.
Absent probable cause, the search warrant should not have been
issued and the search should not have been conducted. Searches
that are conducted in the absence of probable cause are precisely
the type22
of2 'unlawful search or seizure' that is contemplated by our
statute.

The reasoning and argument of this dissenting opinion in
Tart is identical to the majority opinion in Georgia,2 2 3 South Carolina2 2 4 and North Carolina.2 2 5
The good faith exception is not available in Virginia in four
instances:
1. Where the magistrate was misled by information in the
affidavit which the affiant knew was false or should have known
was false,
2. where the issuing magistrate totally abandoned his judicial role,
3. where the warrant was based on an affidavit 'so lacking in
indicia of probable cause' as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable, or
4. where the warrant was so facially deficient that an executing officer could not reasonably have assumed it was valid.2 2 6
The four instances specified above in Robinson, come directly
from Leon. They apply in any state that has adopted the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
In conclusion, Virginia courts have embraced the good faith
exception as "accepted component of Virginia law."2 27 "No justifi222. Tart, 437 S.E.2d at 227 (quoting Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992);
citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60 (Michie 1970); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660
(Id. 1992) (finding no 'good faith' exception in the Idaho Constitution and
statutes); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (finding no
'good faith' exception in the Massachusetts suppression statute); State v. Carter,
370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) (finding no 'good faith' exception in the North
Carolina suppression statute)).
223. Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992).
224. State v. McKnight, 352 S.E.2d 471 (S.C. 1987).
225. State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988).
226. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 453 S.E.2d 916, 918 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
227. Tart, 437 S.E.2d. at 224.
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cation exists for drawing a distinction between the two constitutional provisions for purposes of good faith analysis."2 2s
The Virginia trial judge's order allowing the defendants'
motion to suppress would be reversed on appeal. The drugs seized
by virtue of the defective search warrants would be admissible at
trial under the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Armando and Patsy probably would be convicted in Virginia.
VIII.

NEW JERSEY

Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to
be seized.2 29
This language tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The standard by which courts
measure the affidavit in support of a search warrant is probable
cause. The term "probable cause" appears in both the Fourth
Amendment and in Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution.
New Jersey courts have consistently characterized probable
cause as a common-sense, practical standard for determining the
validity of a search warrant. 230 The New Jersey Supreme Court
has been unwavering in its insistence that affidavits submitted in
support of a warrant application allege specific facts so that the
issuing judge can determine independently whether or not prob2 31
able cause has been established.
State constitutions may be a source of individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.
In the 1987 case of State v. Novembrino,23 2 the New Jersey
Supreme Court interpreted Article I, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution to provide more expansive rights to criminal
228. Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 651 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
229. N.J. CONST. ART. 1, § 7.
230. State v. Kasabucki, 244 A.2d 101, 104 (N.J. 1968).
231. Stat6 v. Macri, 188 A.2d 389, 393 (N.J. 1963), disapproved of by State v.
Fariello, 366 A.2d 1313 (N.J. 1976); see also State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820,
835 (N.J. 1987).
232. State v. Novembrino, 159 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987).
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defendants (and citizens) than the United States Supreme Court
found in Leon under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, although the provisions were almost identical.2 3 3
New Jersey was the third colony to adopt a state constitution.23 4 The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 did not include provisions equivalent to the Bill of Rights. 235 The New Jersey
Constitution of 1844 incorporated a protection against unreasonable searches and seizures virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment and to Article I, paragraph 7 of the 1947 Constitution.2 3 6
New Jersey did not apply the exclusionary rule.2 3 7 In fact, during
the Constitutional Convention of 1947 an amendment to Article I,
paragraph 7 was proposed that would have incorporated the
exclusionary rule into the Constitution: "Nothing obtained in violation thereof shall be received into evidence." 2 38 The amendment
was defeated by a vote of 46 to 25.239
New Jersey first applied the exclusionary rule in State v.
Valentin,2 40 after Mapp held the exclusionary rule applicable to
the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 4 1 The exclusionary rule is now embedded in New Jersey
law. "One obvious consequence of the application of the exclusionary rule in New Jersey has been the encouragement of lawenforcement officials to comply with the constitutionally-mandated probable-cause standard in order to avoid the suppression of
evidence."2 4 2
The New Jersey Supreme Court applies a totality of the cir243
cumstances test analogous to that set forth in Illinois v. Gates
to test the validity of search warrants under the probable cause
standard set forth in Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. In Novembrino the New Jersey Supreme Court stated,
"the 'totality-of-the-circumstances' test that we endorse and apply
in this case is a principle of state constitutional law used to test
determinations of probable cause pursuant to Article I, paragraph
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 857.
Id. at 850 n.28.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 851.
Id.
Sate v. Valentin, 174 A.2d 737 (N.J. 1961).
Id. at 737-738.
Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 854.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 (1983).
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7 of the New Jersey Constitution. We assume that the application
of this standard will be substantially consistent with the criteria
set forth in Illinois v. Gates."2 4 4
Novembrino called upon the New Jersey Supreme Court to
decide if Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution,
which incorporates almost verbatim the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures set forth in the Fourth Amendment,
would tolerate a modification of the exclusionary rule that recognizes the good faith exception established by the United States
Supreme Court in Leon. The Novembrino Court in its discussion
of this issue stated:
"Ultimately, we focus on the inevitable tension between the
proposed good-faith exception and the guarantee contained in our
State Constitution that search warrants shall not issue except
upon probable cause. In the twenty-five years during which we
have applied the exclusionary rule in New Jersey, we have perceived no dilution of our probable cause standard; rather, efforts
to comply with the constitutional mandate have been enhanced.
Nor do we perceive that the application of the exclusionary rule
has in any significant way impaired the ability of law-enforcement
officials to enforce the criminal laws."24 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court does not recognize a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule as it interprets Article I,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. In Novembrino New
Jersey's Supreme Court iterated this by stating:
"Because we believe that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule adopted in Leon would tend to undermine the constitutionally guaranteed standard of probable cause, and in the
process disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by our
criminal justice system to accommodate that constitutional guarantee without impairing law enforcement, we decline to recognize
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule."2 46
The New Jersey appellate courts would affirm the trial judge's
suppression order applying "adequate and independent" state constitutional grounds, under Article I, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution. Armando and Patsy would not be convicted
in New Jersey
244. Novembrino, 519 A.2d at 837n.11.
245. Id. at 855.
246. Id. at 856-857.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Florida constitutional amendment which construes state
constitutional search and seizure rights "in conformity with the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," mandates uniformity of interpretation and application. In fact, it enslaves Article I,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution and the Florida State
Courts to interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the United
States Supreme Court. The Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule ensnares Armando and Patsy in Florida. The
state trial judge's order allowing the motion to suppress would be
reversed by the Florida appellate courts. Armando and Patsy
probably would be convicted in Florida.
The Georgia State legislature mandates the exclusionary rule
in the OCGA section 17-5-30. The Georgia Supreme Court, in
Gary, did not apply the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The judicially created Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule does not apply in Georgia because Georgia's
exclusionary rule is legislatively created. Georgia State courts,
using adequate and independent state grounds, OCGA section 175-30, resolve search and seizure questions in total reliance on the
state statute without considering Leon. The state statute, OCGA
section 17-5-30, imposes greater requirements upon Georgia law
enforcement officers than that required by the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Leon.
The state trial judge in Georgia allows the defense motion to suppress on the basis of OCGA section 17-5-30. Georgia appellate
courts would affirm, by also applying the state statute.
The South Carolina Supreme Court declines to apply the Leon
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule if the underlying affidavit does not include sufficient information to allow a magistrate
to determine probable cause. If a Johnson hearing produces no
evidence of oral sworn testimony having been presented to the
magistrate regarding the informant's reliability, then the South
Carolina trial judge's order of suppression would be affirmed by
the South Carolina appellate courts. Either Article I, section 10 of
the South Carolina Constitution or South Carolina Statute section
17-13-140 provides an adequate and independent state ground for
the ruling.
North Carolina State courts interpret search and seizure
questions by applying "adequate and independent" state grounds.
There is no Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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Article I, section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. North
Carolina appellate courts would affirm the trial court's order
allowing the motion to suppress.
Virginia courts embrace the Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule as "an accepted component of Virginia law."2 4 7
No distinction is drawn between Article I, section 10 of the Virginia Constitution and the Fourth Amendment for purposes of
good faith analysis.2 48 Virginia appellate courts would reverse the
trial court's order allowing the motion to suppress. The evidence
would be admissible at trial under the Leon good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. Armando and Patsy probably would be
convicted in Virginia.
The New Jersey Supreme Court does not recognize a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule as it interprets Article I,
paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. 2 49 New Jersey
appellate courts would affirm the trial judge's order of
suppression.
X.

CONCLUSION

This thesis proves that a criminal defendant, in a factual situation that resembles Leon, can expect disparate results on a
motion to suppress in six eastern seaboard state courts: Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and New
Jersey. The state supreme courts in each of these states assess
probable cause by use of search and seizure provisions in state
constitutions and statutes. State courts that adopt the Leon good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule would convict the defendants (Florida and Virginia). The defendants would succeed in an
appellate review of a suppression hearing in New Jersey, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, if the state supreme court
applies "adequate and independent" state grounds to decide the
case.
The "adequate and independent" state grounds include the
state constitution in New Jersey (Article I, paragraph 7) and in
North Carolina (Article I, section 20). Georgia courts apply a legislatively mandated exclusionary rule, OCGA section 17-5-30.
Either Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution or
the Code of Laws of South Carolina section 17-13-140 provides an
247. Tart v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 219, 224 (Va. Ct. App. 1968).
248. Janis v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 649, 652 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).

249. State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 856 (N.J. 1987).
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"adequate and independent" state ground for the South Carolina
Supreme Court to reject the Leon good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, if the underlying affidavit and a "Johnson"
hearing fail to establish probable cause.
Is it good or bad that disparate outcomes result in various
state trial courts faced with the same facts? The six states in this
thesis are separate and distinct sovereignties. Each state has its
own constitution. Each state supreme court may interpret its own
state constitution and statutes without regard to the federal constitution, so long as Federal Constitutional rights are not
diminished.
The disparity also exists between some state trial courts and
federal district courts. The principle of federalism envisions two
separate and independent judicial systems: federal courts, which
construe federal law, and state courts, which construe state law.
Prior to Mapp, the exclusionary rule did not apply to a state
unless that state, on its own initiative, adopted an exclusionary
rule by statute or case law. Thus, disparate results in search and
seizure cases are part of our legal history.
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of Watergate fame, formerly a Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, explained the historical
significance of the exclusionary rule.
This constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizures has its roots deeply implanted in the human heart,
the common law of England, and the tyrannies perpetrated by
government on the people of England and the colonies.
The oldest and deepest hunger of the human heart is for a
place where one may dwell in peace and security and keep inviolate from public scrutiny one's innermost aspirations and
thoughts, one's most intimate associations and communications,
and one's most private activities. This truth was documented by
Micah, the prophet, 2,700 years ago when he described the Mountain of the Lord as a place where 'they shall sit every man under
his own vine and fig tree and none shall make them afraid.
The common law of England originated in the instincts, the
habits, and the customs of the people. Hence, it is not surprising
that on emerging from the mists of unrecorded history, the English common law embraced as a fundamental principle that every
man's home is his castle and the correlative rule that every man
may resist to the utmost unidentified persons who seek to enter
his home against his will.
The common-law courts of England .. . authorized searches
and seizures only by special warrants, which were based on oaths
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disclosing the reasons for their issuance and describing the places
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The courts of England that were independent of the common
law, such as the Court of Star Chamber... and the Court of High
Commission... did not respect the principle of the common law
that every man's home is his castle.
They authorized searches and seizures by general warrants,
which were based on mere suspicion and commanded searches
and seizures for the enforcement of particular laws without specifying the places to be searched or the persons or things to be
seized. In so doing, the general warrants delegated to the persons
executing them the autocratic power to decide according to their
own notions what places should be searched, what persons should
be arrested, and what things should be seized....
Despite honest beliefs of sincere persons to the contrary, the
exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment. Apart from it, the Amendment's guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures is worse than solemn mockery, and
the Amendment might well be expunged from the Constitution as
a meaningless expression of a merely pious hope....
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by
the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment
in the fundamental law of the land.2 50
Should all trial courts, state and federal, determine and apply
probable cause with a uniform standard? Justice Meyer's dissent
in Carter251 complained about lack of uniformity. His dissent
stated "our state courts create different exclusionary rules
depending upon whether the state or federal Constitutions are
invoked by a defendant making a suppression motion."2 5 2 Mapp
mandated that the exclusionary rule would apply in all state
courts under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp created a uniform national standard. Leon created a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that has been
adopted in some states and rejected in others. The exception
threatens to swallow the rule.
Trial judges know that probable cause review is fact-intensive. As Justice Scalia, dissenting in Ornelas, pointed out:
250. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of The
FourthAmendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 283-284, 287.
251. State v.Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988).
252. Id. at 732, 370 S.E.2d at 567 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/3
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"First, a court must identify all of the relevant historical facts
known to the officer at the time of the stop or search; and second,
it must decide whether, under a standard of objective reasonableness, those facts would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justify25
ing a stop or probable cause to search."
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
stated that trial judges' determinations of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal, but that
"a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." 25 4 The majority opinion cites the need to "maintain
control of, and to clarify the legal principles," and "to provid[e] law
enforcement officers with a defined set of rules which, in most
instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the
interest of law enforcement."2 5 5
State trial judges must follow the law established by their
state supreme courts with regard to the exclusionary rule in
search and seizure cases. State supreme courts must write clear
decisions. Justice Potter Stewart advised all judges:
"The occupation of a judge requires application of its (the
Fourth Amendment) sweeping language to cases presenting the
infinite variety of factual situations that arise in real life. The art
of being a judge, if there is such an art, is in announcing clear
rules in the context of these infinitely varied cases, rules that can
be understood and observed by conscientious government
officials."2 5 6
If State Legislatures and Judiciaries will follow this eloquent
advice, law-enforcement officials and the citizenry as a whole will
be the beneficiaries of clarity, uniformity and consistency in the
law.

253. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 698.
255. Id. at 697-698.
256. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-SeizureCases,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
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